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The Partnership Capital Freeze: An
Examination of Control Retention
by Donor Partners
I. INTRODUCTION-ESTATE PLANNITNG FOR
THE FAMILY BUSINESS
Implementing an estate plan for the owner of a closely held
family business is one of the most challenging tasks an estate plan-
ner will encounter. The estate plan must fulfill the needs of tax
reduction, preservation of the family business and satisfaction of
the dispositive wishes of the client.1
The incentive for transferring the business in a manner which
satisfies these sometimes competing objectives is especially strong
in situations where the value of the enterprise is primarily attribu-
table to the ownership of capital which is rapidly appreciating.
The family farm business best exemplifies the disastrous tax con-
sequences affecting surviving family members when the underly-
ing property of the business appreciates at a rate greatly in excess
of the income realized from the operation.2 Excessive appreciation
of the business property may defeat the desired goal of mainte-
nance of family ownership and control of the business after the
death of the owner-operator because excessive estate tax liability
will require the sale of the business to satisfy those estate taxes.3
The primary objective of an estate plan for owners of a family
business is to "freeze" the value of the owner-operator's equity in
1. Nash, Family Partnerships: A Viable Planning Alternative, 13 U. Mmm EsT.
PLAN. INST. 1000 (1979).
2. See generally Brugh, Structuring the Farm and Ranch Operation for Business
and Estate Planning, 54 NEB. L. REV. 262 (1975); Kelley, The Farm Corpora-
tion As an Estate Planning Device, 54 NEB. L. REv. 217 (1975).
3. Although the burden of the estate tax may be ameliorated through electing
the installment methods of payment under sections 6166 or 6166A of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (Code), these elections may be insufficient to prevent
the sale of the business where the income generated from operations is con-
siderably disproportionate to the value of the underlying assets of the busi-
ness. In addition, the transition of management to surviving family members
frequently results in a decline in the business during the transition, making
available less income for retiring the estate tax liability.
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the business and transfer appreciation of the business assets to
the family members who are to eventually acquire the business.
This freeze is performed by making lifetime gifts through a legal
vehicle created to hold title to the assets from which the gifts are to
be made.4
The legal vehicle primarily utilized by estate planners to ac-
complish the capital freeze has been the family corporation. The
corporate plan is designed to allocate preferred stock with a fixed
value to the older generation owners and place common stock with
the succeeding generation where all subsequent appreciation is to
be channeled. Further value reduction of equity interests may be
achieved through buy-sell agreements used alone or in conjuction
with a recapitalization.5
Recent commentaries have examined the use of family partner-
ships to achieve the capital freeze now commonly accomplished
through a family corporation.6 Among the reasons advanced in
favor of using the partnership vehicle to freeze property for estate
tax valuation is that a partnership is a more flexible legal and tax
structure. This attribute facilitates blending tax savings with the
fulfillment of estate planning objectives ideally suited to the needs
of a family-owned business.
Under the unified transfer tax system established by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, one of the few incentives left for making life-
time gifts is avoidance of transfer taxation on subsequently appre-
ciated property.7 The earlier the owner-operator's estate is frozen,
the greater the benefits which accrue from the bypass of apprecia-
tion in property values. However, the owner of a business who
feels the need for comprehensive estate planning is usually not
ready to relinquish total control of the business nor able to trans-
fer substantial amounts of income from the business' operations.
The owner-operator will also desire to extend control after his
death or retirement to assure that family ownership and control
are maintained and to provide a means for conflict resolution be-
tween his successors.
4. Kelley, supra note 2, at 234.
5. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958). For a recent case dealing with the effect of a
partnership buy-sell agreement on estate tax valuation, see Estate of Bischoff
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
6. Abbin, Partnership Capital Freeze-An Alternative to Corporate Recapitali-
zation, 13 U. MVIAMI EST. PLAN. INST. 1800 (1979); Nash, supra note 1, 1000;
Schriebman, Family Partnerships Can Blend Tax Savings with Fulfillment of
Estate Planning Objectives, 3 EST. PLAN. 164 (1975-1976); Schriebman, Family
Partnerships as an Estate Planning Device Must Pass IRS Muster: Some
Guidelines, 4 EST. PLAN. 16 (1976-1977); Comment, Limited Partnerships: Es-
tate Planning Vehicle for the Family Farm, 59 NEB. L. REV. 55 (1980).
7. D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTs, TRusTs & ESTATES 7
(1977).
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This paper will discuss and analyze aspects of "control" within
a family business which is accomplishing a capital freeze through
a family partnership. Although the following discussion will nec-
essarily touch upon areas other than "control", the paper is not
intended to be an in-depth analysis of all aspects of partnership
capital freezes. In this respect, this article should be read as a cor-
ollary to other commentaries containing a broader perspective of
the subject matter.8
HT. IDENTIFYING THE CONTROL OBJECTIVES OF THE
OWNER-OPERATOR
All estate plans involve unique considerations of which the
practitioner must take account. Generalizations can be made,
however, for the typical family business situation. The estate plan
must: (1) promote family estate creation; (2) provide day-to-day
management by senior family members and supervised participa-
tion therein by family members of the younger generation; (3) take
advantage of multiple taxpayer and gift programs to reduce the
family's total income tax burden now and death tax burden later;
(4) contain a management contingency plan that becomes opera-
tive in the event of disability or death of a managing member of the
family; (5) create estate liquidity through tax planning; and, (6)
provide an estate management and distribution plan following the
death of senior family members responding to the commitment
that the business remain owned by the family for use by future
generations and which also contemplates the probable split of chil-
dren into active and inactive groups.9
The mission of the estate planner is to structure a family part-
nership which will both attain these control objectives and pre-
serve the beneficial tax consequences associated with the
partnership entity.10 The advantages of using a partnership for
such an estate plan are apparent when one examines the partner-
ship provisions under state law" and subchapter K of the Internal
8. See note 6 supra.
9. See Fiore, Analyzing and Planning the Finances and Estate of the Family
Engaged in Agricultural Business, 1 EsT. PLAN. 96, 97 (1973-1974).
10. Although the primary objective of the partnership capital freeze is to reduce
future estate tax liability, the income-splitting effect of a family partnership
must not be overlooked. If the estate planner can structure a completed
transfer for purposes of the estate tax laws and also comply with the income
tax laws which provide for the tax recognition of family partnerships, a
double benefit will accrue to the client. See § IV of text infra.
11. The Uniform Partnership Act, [hereinafter cited as UPAI has been enacted in
48 states and the District of Columbia. In Nebraska, it is codified at NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 67-301 to -343 (Reissue 1976). The Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(1916) [hereinafter cited as ULPA] has has been enacted in 49 states and the
1980]
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Revenue Code (Code).12 Together, these laws operate to achieve a
maximum amount of flexibility and simplicity in the formation and
operation of the family business.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CONTROL PLAN
A. Formation of the Partnership13
The existence of a limited partnership commences when there
are partners, a written partnership agreement, and a filed certifi-
cate of limited partnership complying with the provisions of sec-
tion 2 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA).14 Section
721 of the Code aids the ease of formation by providing that no gain
or loss will be recognized to the partnership or any of its partners
upon the contribution of property in exchange for an interest in
the partnership.' 5
Control over partnership operations may be unrelated to the
percentage of equity ownership in that business. Under the ULPA,
control is vested in the general partners with certain qualifica-
tions,16 and among general partners a managing partner may be
selected. Furthermore, a person may be a general partner and a
limited partner of the same partnership. 17 This division between
ownership and control enhances the flexibility needed to accom-
plish an immediate freeze on the business' valuation while retain-
ing managerial control in the senior-operator. For example, the
owner-operator could hold a nominal general partnership interest
which would give him control over business operations 18 and si-
District of Columbia. In Nebraska, it is codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-201
to -232 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
12. I.R.C. §§ 701-61.
13. The author has assumed that most partnership capital freezes will be
accomplished through limited partnerships since the freeze will ordinarily
parallel the corporate recapitalization. Accordingly, reference to state
partnership law will be primarily to the ULPA rather than general
partnership law.
14. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-202 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
15. The general nonrecognition rule of section 721 does not apply to contribu-
tions of property in which the liabilities assumed by the partnership in the
transfer are in excess of the contributor's basis in the property contributed.
Section 721 also applies only to transfers of property; ordinarily income will
be realized by the transferor if an interest in the partnership is exchanged for
a contribution of services.
16. ULPA § 9; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-209 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
17. ULPA § 12; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-212(1) (Reissue 1976).
18. UPA § 18(e); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-318(e) (Reissue 1976) provides that all part-
ners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business. The ULPA adopts this provision by reference under section 9(1)
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-209(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978)), and grants management
rights upon all general partners of the limited partnership.
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multaneously hold a limited partnership interest, representing al-
most all of his equity interest in the business, which has been
frozen. When the senior owner decides to retire from active partic-
ipation this general partnership interest may be liquidated, sold or
gifted to other partners, or exchanged for a limited partnership in-
terest.19 Provisions for disposition should be provided in the ini-
tial partnership agreement.
B. The Partnership Agreement
The bulk of the estate plan will be embodied in the partnership
agreement. The Code and uniform partnership acts give great def-
erence to the agreement for determining the legal consequences
arising from the business structure.
For income tax purposes, the partners' distributive share of in-
come, loss, deduction, and credit is determined solely by the part-
nership agreement, provided the allocations have economic
effect.20 More stringent distribution restrictions are placed upon
family partnership allocations under section 704(e) of the Code.
Compensation for services rendered to the business must be paid
to the donor before the distributive shares to the donee partners
are determined.21 In addition, the proportionate share of income
and loss attributable to donated capital may not be greater than
the proportionate share attributable to the donor's capital inter-
est.2 2 Also controlled by the partnership agreement are the tax
consequences associated with payments to a retired or deceased
partner in liquidation of his interest.23
The uniform partnership laws rely heavily on the partnership
agreement for defining the legal relationships between the entity
and its partners. The limited partners may agree to establish dif-
fering rates of return and priority of distributions on their respec-
tive interests.24 In other words, differing classes of partnership
19. Section 1031 of the Code which provides for nonrecognition of gain for ex-
changes of like-kind property has been held inapplicable to exchanges of a
general partnership interest for a limited partnership interest. Estate of
Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972), affd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th
Cir. 1974).
20. LR.C. § 704(a), (b) (2). Generally, an allocation will be found to have substan-
tial economic effect if the allocation affects the amount of the partner's share
of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences. 1
W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. W-nrmIRE, FEDERAL TAXAION OF PARTNERSMPS
AND PARTNERS 10-12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MCKEE].
21. I.R.C. § 704(e) (2).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 736.
24. ULPA § 14, NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-214 (Reissue 1976). The statute requires that
differing rates of return be stated in the partnership certificate. In the ab-
sence of differing classes of partnership interests, the limited partners "shall
1980]
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interests may be created. This right is essential to the success of a
partnership capital freeze. The senior owner-operator is allowed
to have a prior fixed rate of return on his frozen interest which is
independent of the business' annual income. Younger family
members' share of profit or gain may be made dependent upon the
economic success of the business. In this manner, all appreciation
of business property will be channeled to those partnership inter-
ests whose value is dependent upon the continued success of the
business and increased valuation of business assets. The distinc-
tion between profits from operations and gains from the sale of
business assets must be clearly delineated in the partnership
agreement. A frozen profits interest will be meaningless unless
distributive shares of gain from the sale of business property is
likewise frozen.
Conceptually, the structure of a typical family partnership may
be analogized to a corporation having three classes of equity inter-
ests. The classes of partnership interests would be held as follows:
(1) senior owner: nonvoting preferred stock having a fixed annual
rate of return and a liquidation value equal to par; (2) passive own-
er: nonvoting preferred stock having a rate of return determined
with relation to earnings and a liquidation value being par value
plus a proportionate share of the increase in property value which
is shared equally with the common stock; and (3) successor-opera-
tors: voting common stock.
In many families there will be children who have no desire to
carry on the business but whom the senior owner will nevertheless
wish to include in his bequests. This will necessarily divide the
owners of the business into active and inactive groups. A primary
objective of the estate plan will require restrictions upon the abil-
ity of those inactive members to threaten the existence or viability
of the business to the detriment of those family members who are
active in the business. State partnership law provides alternatives
for the estate planner in dealing with this problem.
The ULPA allows restrictions to be placed on the right of a lim-
ited partner to withdraw from the partnership. Section 1625 of the
Act provides that consent of all partners is needed before a limited
partner may withdraw and receive return of his contribution, un-
less otherwise provided by the agreement. Absent unanimous
consent, withdrawal may occur only after six months notice has
been given to all other partners. Section 16(3)26 also provides that
stand upon equal footing." Id. Apparently the statute would require that the
limited partner's distributive share be computed on the basis of his or her
proportionate contribution in the absence of a contrary agreement.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-216 (Reissue 1976).
26. Id. § 67-216(3).
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a withdrawing partner has only the right to receive cash in return
for the surrendered interest. Thus, owner-operators who gift lim-
ited partnership interests to absentee members can ensure
through the partnership agreement that successor-operators will
have at least six months to raise financing for such withdrawal.
They may also be assured that an absentee partner will not be able
to cause severance of the business property by demanding distri-
bution of business property on withdrawal.
A limited partner's right to force dissolution is also restricted
under the ULPA.27 Generally, the grounds upon which such a dis-
solution is based are limited to situations of abuse, inability of the
partnership to function, or other equitable grounds making it not
practicable to continue the business. One exception is the failure
of a partnership to return a limited partner's contribution after a
rightful demand for return of his contribution has been made.2 8
Absent extraordinary situations and if a return of capital is given
to a withdrawing partner after a rightful demand for the return of
his contribution, the limited partner's right to dissolution can be
severely restricted by providing in the partnership agreement that
grounds for dissolution are limited to those enumerated by statute.
Of course, more substantial withdrawal restrictions can be im-
posed through buy-sell agreements between the partners and the
27. The limited partner has the right to have dissolution and winding up by de-
cree of court. ULPA § 10(1)(c); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 67-210(1)(c) (Cum. Supp.
1978). The statute, by granting the same right to limited partner's as that
available to general partners, would appear to access section 32 of the UPA
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-332 (Reissue 1976)), which sets forth grounds for disso-
lution by decree. Generally these grounds are limited to situations which
make it not practicable to carry on the business.
28. ULPA § 16(4) (a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-216(4) (a) (Reissue 1976): "A limited
partner may have the partnership dissolved and its affairs wound up when
(a) He rightfully but unsuccessfully demands the return of his contribution
This section must, however, be read in conjunction with section 67-216(2)
which specifies when a limited partner may "rightfully" demand return of his
contribution. A rightful demand may be made only on dissolution or on the
date specified in the certificate. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-216(2) (a) & (b) (Reissue
1976). Absent a provision in the certificate, a limited partner has the right to
return of his contribution after giving six months notice to all other partners.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-216(2) (c) (Reissue 1976).
This ability to restrict a limited partner's right to withdraw from the part-
nership can be a useful tool for the estate planner. The most obvious area in
which a withdrawal restriction should be used is in resolving the conflict be-
tween active and passive owners. Active owners can be assured continued
control of the business without fear of having to finance withdrawals by pas-
sive owners in the future. However, substantial restrictions upon the right of
a limited partner to withdraw from the partnership and receive his propor-
tionate contribution may cause adverse tax consequences. See § IV-A of text
infra.
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partnership. Such agreements would supersede the remedies con-
ferred under the uniform partnership laws.
It will be necessary to prevent termination of the partnership
upon the death, retirement or insanity of the general partner. This
continuity may be provided by granting the remaining general
partners the right to carry on the business; 29 this right must be
enumerated in the partnership agreement and acknowledged in
the certificate of limited partnership.30 The mechanics of manage-
ment succession should be expressly stated. One technique calls
for the partnership agreement to provide that upon the death or
insanity of a general partner his interest as a general partner auto-
matically converts into a limited partnership interest.31 This facili-
tates a smooth transition of management to remaining general
partners in a manner which precludes involvement by the estate
or guardianship of the former general partner. One aspect of the
plan which should not be overlooked is what options should be im-
plemented if, in succeeding generations, there remain no family
members willing to take an active management role. A contingent
right to dissolution in the event of this circumstance should be
given to the partners in the agreement.
C. Distributive Shares of Profits and Gains
A senior owner-operator will often desire a business structure
which will allow him to retire from active management duties yet
permit him to retain a steady source of income from the business.
This is the typical function of the partnership capital freeze. How-
ever, the owner of the frozen partnership interest must be aware of
the competing income and estate tax consequences associated
with current distributions from the partnership. Improper plan-
ning could cause the freeze to fail in reducing estate tax valuations
or cause large amounts of current income to be attributed to him
from the donated interests.
The distributive share of income and gain allocated to the fro-
zen partnership interest must be delineated in the partnership
agreement in accordance with the client's needs. This allocation
will be upheld under the income tax laws if it has substantial eco-
nomic effect 32 and the donee partners' proportionate share of part-
nership distributions is not proportionately greater than the
29. ULPA § 20(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-220(a) (Reissue 1976).
30. ULPA §2(1)(a)(XIII); NEB. REV. STAT. §67-202(1)(a)(xiii) (Cum. Supp.
1978).
31. Christensen, Family Limited Partnerships-Their Role in Estate Planning,
117 TE. & EST. 585, 585 (1978).
32. I.R.C. § 704(a), (b).
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distributive share allocated to the donor's capital interest.3 3
The estate planner should be aware that a difference does exist
between ownership of a profits interest and a capital interest. It is
crucial to the success of the freeze that the partnership agreement
distinguish the donor's profit interest from his capital interest.34
Because the income tax laws do not prevent a larger share of in-
come from being allocated to the donor-partner's interest in com-
parison with the donated interests, the agreement can provide for
a large amount of income to go to the donor partner during life and
still accomplish a freeze upon the donor's capital interest for estate
tax valuation purposes. 35 Alternatively, the donor's lifetime in-
come needs may be provided through a system of guaranteed pay-
ments for use of the donor's capital.36 Such payments should
constitute a section 707(c) payment and be deductible by the part-
nership under the Code.3 7
33. Id. § 704(e) (2). The regulations promulgated under section 704(e) provide
that if the partnership agreement fails to allocate income in accordance with
section 704(e) (2), income for the taxable year shall be reallocated in accord-
ance with the partners' respective interests in partnership capital. Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (b) (1956). See Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180
(1967). The profits of a partnership in a ranching operation in which profits
were distributed equally were reallocated to the donor partner when it was
found that, under Montana law, the gift of real property was not completed.
The donee's capital interest did not include the value of the ranch land and
therefore, the donee's distributive share of profits was proportionately
greater than his capital interest in the partnership, contravening section
704(e) (2) of the Code.
34. Ordinarily, the profits interest will be stated as either an amount annually
applicable to, or a percentage of, the total frozen capital interest. Abbin,
supra note 6, 1802.1.
35. However, disproportionate allocations could conceivable constitute a re-
tained income interest within the meaning of section 2036(a) (1) if the alloca-
tion has no economic reality under a profits interest analysis.
One commentator has noted that, "conceivably, the gift of a partnership
interest which has been specifically allocated capital and § 1231 gain to the
exclusion of other income may constitute a transfer with retained life estate
under I.R.C. § 2036 since the donor has retaied the income from the property."
Kelley, Estate Planning for the Farmer and Rancher, in 1979 Great Plains Tax
Institute: Program Materials.
36. If a section 707(c) guaranteed payment is made to the frozen partnership in-
terest it would seem that the income tax laws would also require a distribu-
tive share of income to be made to that interest in addition to the guaranteed
payment. A collective reading of sections 704(e) (1), 704(e) (2) and 707(a) in-
dicates that a guaranteed payment is not equivalent to a "distributive share"
under the family partnership distribution rules of section 704(e) (2). Thus, in
determining whether donor's distributive share of partnership income meets
the section 704(e) (2) requirement of not being proportionately less than the
distributive share attributable to donated capital, guaranteed payments to
the donor are disregarded.
37. Payments made to partners for their services to the partnership will be de-
ductible as a section 707(c) guaranteed payment if the amount of the pay-
1980]
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In contrast to income tax laws, the value of the frozen partner-
ship interest for purposes of estate tax should be based on the
amount established in the partnership agreement upon termina-
tion or withdrawal from the partnership.38 Agreements such as
buy-sell and rights of first refusal which establish the value of the
interests for estate taxes have been given effect by the courts. 39
Therefore, it is imperative that the partnership agreement estab-
lish the independence of the capital interest from the income inter-
est. In other words, it must be made clear that a partnership inter-
est has a value in liquidation wholly unrelated to its value in part-
nership profits. If successful, the estate planner can provide his
client with the best of both worlds, an adequate and guaranteed
level of income during life and a low estate tax valuation after
death.40
D. The Ability to Transact with the Partnership
Section 13 of the ULPA4 1 permits a limited partner to transact
with the partnership or loan it money. This right is complemen-
tary to section 707 of the income tax laws and increases the estate
planner's options with respect to retained controls.
The ability to treat a partner as a third party for services ren-
dered or capital loaned to the partnership may be particularly ben-
eficial to a family business which is in the midst of a capital freeze.
A senior member holding a limited partnership interest might be
hired by the firm as consultant or in some other similar capacity
and receive a salary which would be deductible by the partnership
as a section 707(c) payment. This would also avoid many of the
difficulties associated with special allocations and differing profit
and capital interests which were implemented for the purpose of
providing the senior-owner with a retirement income.42
Viewing a partner as a potential third party greatly increases
the planning options available for the business. For example, sug-
ment is determined without regard to partnership income. If a formula is
used to compute the compensation for services, it must be based on variables
which are not associated with the partnership's annual income. Variables
which are too closely associated with partnership income may fail to meet the
section 707(c) requirement. In Pratt v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 203 (1975) man-
agement fees paid to partners which were based on a percentage of rental
income were held to be income distributions and not guaranteed payments.
38. Abbin, supra note 6, T 1802.3.
39. See e.g., Estate of Bishoff v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 32 (1977); Fiorito v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C. 440 (1959), acq., 1960-1 C.B. 4.
40. For a discussion of the factors involved in structuring the income rights of a
frozen partnership interest, see Abbin, supra note 6, 1802.2.
41. NE . REv. STAT. § 67-213 (Reissue 1976).
42. See § III-C of text supra.
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gested estate plans for a family farm have called for the holding of
the farm land in a family partnership with the donor retaining the
operating assets of the farm for lease to the partnership. Under
ULPA section 1343 the donor might retain a frozen limited interest
in the land holding partnership and still be able to transact with
the partnership as lessor of the operating assets.
E. Conflict Between Active and Inactive Ownership Interests
Invariably, the senior owner-operator, having no other proper-
ties but the business, will be faced with the dilemma of providing
for children or other family members who have no desire to carry
on the family business. A method of control must be implemented
which will allow active owners to operate the business free from
interference from passive absentee owners. This objective may be
best achieved through creation of a limited partnership with differ-
ing classes of limited partnership interests for the passive owners
and vest control in active owners through the holding of general
partnership interests.
It is important to reiterate that the donor has the ability to re-
strict the limited partners' right to freely withdraw from the part-
nership or cause its dissolution.44 The minimum six month
waiting period on limited partner withdrawals which is imposed by
statute in the absence of any withdrawal restriction 45 should be
adequate to protect the successor-operators from rash or retribu-
tive actions taken by the withdrawing partner. During that period
a reconciliation could be made or, if the limited partner remains
adamant, sufficient time is given to raise the financing necessary to
return the contribution. Additionally, transfer restrictions such as
buy-sell, rights of first refusal, or lease commitments in favor of
active owners may be employed to guarantee that the land remain
within the control of active family owners. 46
The partnership agreement should provide a means for future
dispute resolution between the active and inactive owners. To il-
lustrate, standards may be established under which a general or
managing partner must make decisions regarding retention of in-
come for business needs, expansion of the business, investment
decisions, and other management decisions which would many
times conflict with the limited partners' desire for cash distribu-
tions. Remedies would be available under the ULPA if such stan-
43. NEB. REv. STAT. § 67-213 (Reissue 1976).
44. See notes 27-28 & accompanying text supra.
45. ULPA § 16(2)(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-216(2)(c) (Reissue 1976).
46. However, withdrawal restrictions upon donated interests could cause ad-
verse income tax consequeces. See § IV-A of text infra.
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dards were violated.4 7 The compensation given managing partners
for their services may be established by formula in the agreement
and amendable only by ratification from the limited partners.48
There are, however, tax risks associated with many commonly
used control devices. A trade-off between retained control and tax
benefits often times exists in the income and estate tax laws. The
next two sections are devoted to this conflict between donor re-
tained controls and the tax consequences desired by the donor.
IV. INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
In view of the fact that most clients would also benefit from the
income splitting effect associated with family partnership opera-
tions, the relationship of control techniques with partnership in-
come tax consequences must be considered by the estate planner.
The regulations under section 704(e) of the Code set forth basic
tests of ownership to be administered in determining whether a
donee partner who has been given a capital interest in the partner-
ship possesses the real incidents of ownership, or whether the do-
nor has retained actual dominion and control over the interest.4 9 If
ownership is found to be vested in the donor partner, income at-
tributable to the donated interests will be reallocated to the donor
for income tax recognition. Unfortunately, these family partner-
ship rules will often directly conflict with desirable control devices
for family businesses.
A. Transfer Restrictions
Treasury Regulation § 1.704(e) (2) (ii) (b) states that a limitation
on the right of the donee to liquidate or sell his interest in the part-
nership at his discretion and without financial detriment will be
considered a significant retained control by the donor. Transfer re-
47. See ULPA § 9(1) (a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-209(1) (a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) which
forbids the general partner to do any act in contravention of the certificate.
This provision would invoke equitable jurisdiction for wronged partners.
A more severe remedy provided by partnership statutes is dissolution by
judicial decree for willful or persistent breaches of the partnership agree-
ment. UPA § 32(1) (d); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-332(1) (d) (Reissue 1976). Al-
though it is unclear as to whether the grounds for dissolution under the
ULPA are the same as those enumerated in section 32 of the UPA, it is proba-
ble that a court would adopt the grounds set forth by the UPA.
48. In Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448, the Service ruled that limited partners'
right or lack of the right to vote on the removal and election of a general part-
ner is not a factor of critical importance in determining whether a partner-
ship is taxable as a corporation. Similarly, the right by the limited partners to
amend the general partner's salary should not threaten association status for
income taxation.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1)-(2) (1956).
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strictions placed upon limited partners are particularly susceptible
to attack because other indicia of retained control are irrelevant
in the limited partnership context. The regulations sustain this
distinction, providing that retained managerial control will be ig-
nored in assessing ownership, provided the donee limited partners
have the right to transfer or liquidate their interests without sub-
stantial restrictions. 50 Expressly designated as an adverse re-
tained control is a requirement that the interest be maintained in
the business for a long period of time.5 '
These regulations directly affect the drafting of the buy-sell and
liquidation provisions of the partnership agreement. One leading
commentator advises that, as a safeguard to income tax recogni-
tion, the partnership agreement provide that any partner may de-
mand liquidation of his interest within a reasonable time after
demand at a value which is not materially less than the value of
the interest.52
Despite this admonishment, the committee report to the fore-
runner of section 704(e) 53 of the Code indicates that not every re-
striction upon donated interests will be indicative of sham; that
restrictions of "the character incident to the normal relationships
among partners"54 may be bona fide and not inconsistent with do-
nee ownership. A persuasive argument could be forwarded that
transfer restrictions necessary to the success of the donor's estate
plan, e.g., retention of the business within the family, is a control
incident to a normal relationship among the partners.55 Further-
more, section 704(e) is not the sole test for determining the bona
fides of a family partnership. A taxpayer may establish that there
exists a valid partnership under the test prescribed in Commis-
sioner v. Culbertson:5 6 that there existed a good faith intent to
50. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix) (1956).
51. Id. This position has also been adopted by case law. In holding that the do-
nors of family partnership interests were the true owners of the donated in-
terests for income tax purposes, the court in Krause v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
890 (1972), af'd, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974) listed as a factor in its decision
that "[t] he partnership agreement prevented the trustees [who held the in-
terests] from assigning or disposing of the trusts' interest in the partnership
without... [the donors'] consent. It was uncertain if the contributions of
the limited partners would ever be returned." Id. at 898.
52. 2 A. W.Ts, PARTNERSIP TAXATION § 52.06 (2d ed. 1976).
53. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., at 32-34, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1781, 1813-15, reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 380-81 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 586].
54. Id. at 33, [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1781, 1815, 1951-2 C.B. at 381.
55. See Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977) where the tax court
held that restrictive buy-sell agreements which are implemented to preserve
family control and continuity of management in the family business have a
legitimate business purpose.
56. 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949).
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conduct affairs as partners.
Relevant to the imposition of transfer restrictions upon donated
interests is the committee report's statement that "[i]n weighing
the effect of a retention of any power upon the bona fides of a pur-
ported gift or sale, a power exercisable for the benefit of others
must be distinguished from a power vested in the transferor for his
own benefit."57 The primary purpose of placing transfer restric-
tions on partnership interests in the typical capital freeze plan is to
maintain family ownership and to accommodate the competing in-
terests of absentee and active owners. In many plans, the donor
will retain no managerial controls and will hold passive limited
partnership interests subject to the same transfer restrictions im-
posed on other donee interests. Transfer restrictions implemented
under such circumstances are arguably not relevant to the test of
ownership under the rationale postulated in the legislative history
of section 704(e) since such restrictions are not imposed for the
transferor's own benefit. Furthermore, overriding business pur-
poses, such as keeping the family business intact should override
the prohibitions in the regulations. 58 In deciding whether to im-
pose severe transfer restrictions the estate planner must realize
that the factors set forth in the regulations are illustrative, not ex-
haustive, and that the issue of control is ultimately a factual ques-
tion turning on all of the circumstances.5 9
B.. Retention of Essential Assets
A solution which is often used in estate planning for family
businesses is separating the operating portion of the unit from the
land holding portion of the unit and gifting or selling the units ac-
cordingly.60 Interfering with the free utilization of such plans are
the regulations to section 704(e) of the Code which classify a do-
nor's retention of control of assets essential to the business as a
factor indicating that a bona fida partnership does not exist for in-
come tax purposes.61 Specifically listed as an example is a reten-
tion of assets which are leased to the partnership. Plans calling for
a division of the business between the family partnership and do-
nor with a leaseback arrangement could cause the donor of the
partnership interests to be attributed all partnership income. For
example, if in the family farm situation the donor-parents create
57. H.R. REP. No. 586, supra note 50, at 33, 11951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1781, 1815, 1951-2 C.B. at 381.
58. Schriebman, supra note 6. See note 55 & accompanying text supra.
59. See, e.g., Ketter v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 637, 648 (1978).
60. Kelley, Planning the Estate of the Farm and Ranch owner: Solutions to Re-
curring Prolems, 43 J. TAx. 350, 351 (1975).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (c) (1956).
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and gift a family partnership in the farm land but retain all the
farm machinery and equipment for leaseback to the partnership,
the Service might argue the dominion and control of the land has
not been vested in the donee partners.62
The regulations, however, are directed toward controls retained
by donors and do not concern control vested in donees. Therefore,
control of essential assets by donee partners for lease-back to the
partnership would not contravene the ownership test of the regula-
tions.63 Thus, any leasing arrangements between the partnership
and the successor operators entered into for the purpose of assur-
ing that active donees maintain control over the business should
not cause imputation of ownership to the donor. One control tech-
nique which is compatible with this analysis would call for the do-
nor to gift limited partnership interest in the land to absentee
owners and the operating assets and inventory to the successor-
operator. The successor-operator would then enter into a long-
term lease with the partnership with a possible option to buy out
the passive partners. In this manner, the passive owners may be
assured a continuing income flow from their interests and active
owners will be free to operate the business without outside inter-
ference. Moreover, the donor partner, holding a frozen interest in
the land holding partnership, has not retained an incident of own-
ership over the donee interests which would invite income tax lia-
bility. The successor-operator who now owns the business
operating assets and inventory may also be a partner in the land-
holding partnership. 64
62. This example was taken from United States v. Ramos, 393 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968), where it was held that retention by
donor-parents of all the operating assets of the farm which were leased to a
family partnership formed to operate a farming business constituted an an-
ticipatory assignment of income from the property. Although the case would
seem distinguishable on grounds that all assets of the farm were retained by
the parents, commentators appear unwilling to advise that land holdings op-
erating business assets can be controlled by the donor partners. But see Es-
tate of Barlow v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 666 (1971). See also Christensen,
supra note 31, at 585; Nash, supra note 1, 1009.3 (suggests that a lease which
only indirectly effects control over the business should be valid if reasonable
and a customary type of transaction).
63. See Kelley, supra note 60, at 351. The author states that separation of land
holding and operating portions of the family farm is an often used solution to
provide for the competing interests of active and passive successive genera-
tions. The passive land holders will ordinarily serve as landlords for the suc-
cessor-operators. Id.
64. ULPA § 13(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-213(1) (Reissue 1976) expressly allows a
limited partner to transact business with the partnership.
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C. Operational Controls
The regulations under section 704(e) of the Code enumerate
other general retained controls as being inconsistent with donee
ownership of partnership capital. The estate planner should be
aware that restrictions or control over the distribution of income to
the donee interests, other than control over the amounts of income
necessary for the reasonable needs of business, will be considered
as showing the ownership of donated interests has not vested in
the donee partners. 65 It is important in drafting the partnership
agreement to specify that all partnership earnings shall be distrib-
uted, except for amounts retained, "for the reasonable needs of
business." 66
Retention of management powers by the donor as general part-
ner or through another entity is not significant provided the donee
is free to liquidate or sell his interest.67 Freedom of the donee to
transfer or liquidate his interest refers to more than the absence of
legal transfer restrictions. The facts and circumstances must show
that the donee is independent of the donor and has such maturity
and understanding of his rights to withdraw from the partner-
ship.68 Obviously, this proviso is directed toward minor children of
the donor; however, the donor's spouse or mature children who are
dependent upon the donor for economic support might be amena-
ble to the donor's will. In cases of doubt, the partnership interest
might be held by an independent trustee. 69 In all cases an eviden-
tiary record should be compiled showing participation in manage-
ment by the partners in their permitted capacity.7 0 In this respect
it would be wise to provide for some decision-making input by lim-
ited partners for various matters. For example, written consent
could be required of limited partners for retention of income for
business needs above a specified level.71
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (a) (1956).
66. 2 A. WnLLs, supra note 52, § 52.06. See Driscoll v. United States, 24 A.F.T.R.2d
69-5249 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (b), (d) (1956).
68. Id. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (d) (1956).
69. Id. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1956) for the Service's position with regard to trust-
ees serving as partners.
70. There must also be developed a record showing that donees are actually
treated as partners in the operation of the business. Id. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vi)
includes such a showing as a test of ownership for purposes of I.R.C. § 704(e).
Among the factors listed by the regulations are: recognition of donee's rights
in distributions on partnership property and profits, the existence of written
agreements and records establishing the nature of the partnership agree-
ment and the rights of the respective partners, the presentment of the donee
to the public as a partner in matters such as insurance policies, leases, and
business contracts.
71. However, management powers vested in the limited partners could cause the
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The estate planner must realize that the basic tests of owner-
ship are guidelines only, that any one factor listed in the regula-
tions is not in itself determinable on the issue of ownership. Thus,
if it is necessary to impose a control considered inconsistent with
donee ownership (e.g., transfer restrictions) it would be beneficial
to provide added ownership attributes in another area (e.g.,
greater voice in management).
D. Competing Considerations
If the present owner is in a position where he is willing to trans-
fer management to a successor-operator, the bona fides of the part-
nership will be much easier to establish under the income tax
laws. However, this is often not the case. The owner's children
may be too young or unsettled to fully assume full responsibilities
of running the business or the owner is simply not ready for semi-
retirement. This could force the estate planner to take an aggres-
sive stance on income tax issues in order to establish a capital
freeze which comports with the client's wishes and needs. In
many instances the freeze should receive priority over the income
tax consequences.7 2 Unfortunately, the spectre of retained con-
trols rears its head in the estate tax context and may operate to
defeat estate plans designed to limit the valuation of the donor's
gross estate.
V. ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
RETAINED CONTROLS
The family partnership may be used as an estate planning tool
independent of its income tax consequences. The law developed
under section 704(e) of the Code regarding tax recognition of fam-
ily partnerships is not applicable to the estate and gift tax laws.
An overlap does exist, however, with case law developed from Cul-
bertson7 3 in determining the realities of the transfer.
loss of their limited liability under the ULPA. "A limited partner shall not
become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the
business .... " ULPA § 7. Cases in which general liability has been imposed
usually involved factual situations in which the exercise of power by limited
partners has been clear cut and extensive. For an excellent analysis of sec-
tion 7 of the ULPA, see Coleman & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited
Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. L.J. 887, 897 (1976).
72. The most apparent situation in which estate tax considerations will prevail
over income tax considerations is in the family farm estate plan where real
estate appreciation has increased astronomically over the last generation
while farm income has increased at relatively moderate levels.
73. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). Culbertson was utilized
by a taxpayer in United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956) to estab-
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A partnership not recognized under income tax laws may nev-
ertheless be valid for estate tax purposes. This principle was first
advanced by the Service in Blalock v. Allen.7 4 The case involved
the Service's contention that a decedent's interest in a family part-
nership should be included in his gross estate even though in an
earlier action the decedent was found not to be a partner for in-
come tax purposes. 75 The issue was accurately condensed by the
court:
His estate now contends that, if he was not a partner, the value of his in-
terest in the firm belonged to the other three Blalocks and should not be
included in his estate. The defendant (IRS) contends that, while not a
partner for income tax purposes, he did own a proprietary interest in
these firms and estate taxes were due thereon.
7 6
The court did not directly rule on this estate tax issue as the ques-
tion became moot when the court found the decedent a bona fide
partner for income tax purposes for the years subsequent to the
earlier decision.77 The distinction between ownership for the pur-
poses of the income tax and ownership for purposes of the estate
tax was also addressed in Aldrich v. United States78 where the
Fifth Circuit adopted the arguments stated in the government's
brief as controlling principles of law.
[A] taxpayer owning a capital interest in a partnership under state law
must include that interest in his gross estate whether or not he is taxable
on any portion of the income of the partnership. The courts have not de-
veloped a rule against estate plitting similar to the income tax rule
79
Income tax and estate tax principles were once again distin-
guished in Krause v. Commissioner.8 0 In that case the taxpayer
lish a partnership between the decedent and his wife which had the effect of
removing one-half of the partnership property from decedent's gross estate.
The Court of Appeals found the partnership to be valid despite the fact that
there existed no partnership agreement and all partnership property was
held in decedent's name.
Neel was held to be controlling precedent in Craig v. United States, 451 F.
Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978). In Craig, the court found a partnership to exist be-
tween a decedent and spouse in a farming operation under the "intent" test
of Culbertson. Thus, only one-half the value of personal property used by the
farming operation was properly includible in the decedent's gross estate. But
see Estate of Ethel M. Bullock, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1080 (1960).
74. 100 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Ga. 1951).
75. The income tax case which held the interest owned by decedent invalid for
income tax recognition was Blalock v. Allen, 56 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Ga. 1944),
affd per curiam, 151 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1945).
76. Blalock v. Allen, 100 F. Supp. 869, 872 (M.D. Ga. 1951).
77. Id. at 874-75. The estate had conceded the estate tax issue as its action was
brought in the alternative with the income tax issue. Id. at 875.
78. 346 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 39 (citing the government's brief).
80. 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'ing, 57 T.C. 890 (1972).
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argued that United States v. Byrum,81 an estate tax case arising
under section 2036 of the Code, was precedent for challenging tax
liability arising under section 704(e) of the income tax laws. In
holding that Byrum was not controlling, the court reasoned that
principles developed under the estate tax laws were not necessar-
ily germane to income tax issues.82 "The estate tax statute in-
volved in Byrum, § 2036(a), is different in language, legislative
history, and objectives, from the income tax statute involved in the
present case, § 704(e). ' '83
As a result of these decisions, the courts' position would appear
to be that for estate tax purposes, the ownership interest in a part-
nership is determined by reference to state law; assignment of in-
come principles codified under section 704(e) and the regulations
thereto do not interrelate with estate tax concepts. Thus, the test
of whether the transfer of a partnership interest is complete for
purposes of the estate tax is to be determined by reference to sec-
tions 2036 and 2038 of the Code.84
A. Retained controls by the Donor-Partner
In accomplishing the freeze the extent of permissible retained
controls must be determined. Four fact patterns have been identi-
fied which might cause the estate plan to contravene the provi-
sions of sections 2036 and 2038 of the estate tax laws: retention of
management powers, retention of majority control of partnership
interests, failure to distribute income or accumulation of unrea-
sonable amounts of income to donated interests, and restrictions
81. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
82. Krause v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (6th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 1111.
84. These estate tax provisions require the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate
of the value of any property which was transferred by inter vivos gift, if:
the decedent had retained for his life "the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property, 'LR.C. § 2036(a) (1);
or
the decedent had retained for life "the right, either alone or in con-
junction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom", I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2);
or....
the enjoyment of the property transferred was subject to a power
held by decedent at his death to alter, amend, revoke or terminate
the transferred property interest. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1).
There exists an overlap of coverage between sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038; the
same transfer can, and usually is, includible in the gross estate under either
provision. However, section 2036(a) (2) will generally include larger amounts
within the gross estate by virtue of the language utilized in the statute. Sec-
tion 2036(a) (2) also reaches contingent powers not reachable under section
2038.
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on transferability of donated interests. 85
Due to the nature of a family partnership, sections 2036 and 2038
are potential problems anytime a gift is made of a partnership in-
terest, unless the donor relinquishes all vestiges of control over the
donated interests.86 However, this is usually not a viable alterna-
tive to the owner of a family business who finds it necessary to
remain at the helm. To complicate matters, the partnership area is
fraught with uncertainty regarding estate tax consequences and
little guidance is available to the planner for determining how
much control the donor may retain over income and business oper-
ations of the partnerships.
Some clues do exist for the estate planner who seeks answers
to the riddle of retained controls in the family partnership context.
The Service has revealed its position in a recent letter ruling which
was reissued in 1979.87 Further guidance can be found from the
few partnership cases arising under section 2036 and by analogy to
the Byrum case which addressed corresponding issues in the cor-
porate area. Finally, decisions dealing with valuation of partner-
ship interests under the estate tax have alluded to the possible
estate tax implications of donor retained controls.
B. Letter Ruling 7824005
In private letter ruling 7824005 the Service ruled that the value
of farm land which was held in a limited partnership with the dece-
dent-donor's family members must be included in the decedent's
gross estate under retained life estate principles of section 2036.
Under the facts prompting the letter ruling, the donor contrib-
uted farm land to a newly formed limited partnership which con-
sisted of herself as sole general partner and eight family members
as limited partners. The family members who received interests
were eventual heirs of the decedent-donor. Decedent's capital in-
85. Nash, supra note 1, 1 1023. Nash contends that the major arguments for in-
cludibility center upon sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038. Under section
2036(a) (2) the Service would likely contend that the donor-partner, through
his continued management and control of the partnership, in effect, allows
him or her to control not only the partnership property but also the stream of
income from the property, thereby retaining a right to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income derived therefrom. Id.
1025. The potential arguments under section 2038 are similar, that a donor-
partner's control of the partnership through the exercise of administrative
and management powers may be considered a power to alter or amend the
enjoyment of the partnership property. Id. 1026.
86. If the owner-operator's frozen interest is held as a passive limited partner-
ship interest with active management vested totally within general partners,
sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038 should not be applicable.
87. Tech. Adv. Memo. 7824005 (issued Mar. 2, 1970; reissued 1978).
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terest consisted of a sixty percent interest as general partner and a
twenty percent interest as a limited partner, although the limited
interest was later gifted to the other partners. Broad powers were
given under the partnership agreement to the general partner
along with the right to an annual salary of $12,000 for management
services. The decedent was not actively involved in farming opera-
tions but rented the farmland for approximately $20,000 per year in
the first year of the partnership's existence.
Nearly all of the cash flow was distributed to the decedent dur-
ing the partnership's existence by reason of her guaranteed pay-
ment and sixty percent share of partnership profit. In the two
years preceding decedent's death, all of the cash flow went to dece-
dent in year one and eighty-eight percent in year two.
In ruling that the full value of the farm was includible in dece-
dent's gross estate under section 2036, the Service relied heavily on
case law which holds that there exists a retained life estate when
there is an implied understanding or prearrangement between the
donor and donee which allows the donor to enjoy the property for
his or her life.88 The ruling distinguished case law which had held
that the receipt of a salary from administering donated property is
not a retained income interest on grounds that the salary was not
related to the services rendered by the decedent.89 No manage-
ment was required because the only income generated was rental
income, in fact, any management that was required was actually
performed by other members. Other factors relied upon by the
Service indicating a retained income interest were: (1) the part-
nership was created only for estate tax purposes and served no
general business purpose; (2) the decedent continued to reside on
the farm which was in itself a retention of farm income potential;
and (3) the salary, together with the decedent's rights to profits
were calculated to ensure that the decedent would receive virtu-
ally all income produced from the land.
One commentator has labeled the fact pattern underlying the
ruling as "extreme" and as such, the result is essentially correct.90
88. The Service cited Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d F.2d 667 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
89. Taxpayer's reliance on Estate of Hofford v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 542 (1945)
was found to be misplaced as in Hofford, the court specifically found that the
decedent had rendered worthwhile services. The Service instead cited Es-
tate of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A 807 (1942), result aFfd, 1 T.C. 564
(1943), a case where corporate stock which was gifted to children of the donor
with an agreement that the donor receive a guaranteed salary for life regard-
less of the donor's health or performance was included in decedent's gross
estate. In essence, the salary payments represented a retained income inter-
est. See Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 790-91 (1972) for a discussion of
the Hofford and Holland cases.
90. Abbin, supra note 6, 1806.1.
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It is urged that a retained interest in the form of a frozen partner-
ship interest should escape the clutches of section 2036 as there
exists substantial economic policy reasons to justify its existence
for estate tax purposes.9 1 In the typical situation, the holder of the
frozen interest is not retaining an interest in the total income of
the partnership, but is rather foregoing a right to potential appreci-
ation in income and property values in return for a present right to
a fixed income and capital interest.
If the estate plan formulated for the client requires the donor-
partner to remain as general partner or managing partner of the
business, the letter ruling provides the following rudimentary
guidelines for avoiding retained life estate problems. If the donor-
manager is to receive guaranteed payments for services, the serv-
ices must actually be performed by the donor and the compensa-
tion paid be reasonable for that type of service. 92 In addition, the
services must be essential to the business; the ruling shows that
the Service will scrutinize the type of business activity being con-
ducted by the partnership in determining whether the services
performed by the donor-partner are bona fide. Should the amount
paid to the donor as guaranteed payments constitute substantially
all of the revenue generated by the business, there is a danger that
the Service will assert that an income interest has been retained
by the donor-partner. If the donor is to continue to dwell on the
partnership property, the dwellings should either be excluded
from the initial contribution to the partnership or be distributed
back to the donor so that the residence is individually owned by
the donor-partner.
93
In instances where the guaranteed payment to the donor con-
stitutes nearly the entire gross income of the partnership, the es-
tate planner should bolster the economic realities of the plan so as
to provide an effective counter-attack against section 2036 applica-
bility. One method would be to give the limited partners the right
to remove the managing donor-partner from control should income
available for distribution to limited partners fail to meet certain
specified levels for a certain number of years. Such a provision in
the partnership agreement would tend to show that the donor is
not merely retaining an income interest for life, that he is being
paid for the purpose of producing an income flow to the partners
and is subject to sanction from the other partners should his serv-
91. Id.
92. See Estate of Hofford v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 542 (1945).
93. This distribution by the partnership would be tax-free although the distribu-
tee must reduce the adjusted basis in his partnership interest. I.R.C. § 733.
There will be no "hot asset" problems involved as distributions of property
which the distributee contributed to the partnership are exempt from the
"hot asset" provision. Id. § 751(b) (2) (A).
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ices fail to produce the specified levels of income.94
C. United States v. Byrum95
In the landmark decision of United States v. Byrum, the
Supreme Court held that the power to control a corporation
through retention of majority voting rights in transferred stock, ex-
ercised through control over dividends or business policy, does not
constitute a legal right to control beneficial enjoyment of an inter-
est in the corporation for purposes of section 2036 of the Code. The
principles of retained managerial controls developed by this case
should apply with equal force to the partnership context.96
In Byrum, the decedent created an irrevocable trust to which
he transferred shares of stock in three closely held corporations.
He maintained a seventy-one percent control over each corpora-
tion. The trusts, which were administered by an independent
trustee, were subject to four essential rights which were reserved
by the decedent over the'transferred stock: (1) the right to vote
the shares of stock which were transferred to the trust; (2) to dis-
approve the sale or transfer of the shares; (3) to approve invest-
ments and reinvestments; and (4) to remove the trustee and
designate a new corporate trustee as a successor.97 The Service
assessed a deficiency against the decedent's estate, contending
that decedent's right to vote the transferred shares and to veto any
sale thereof granted him the power to determine the flow of in-
come to the trust-equivalent to a power to designate the persons
who shall enjoy the income from the property.98 In addition, it was
urged that the retained controls constituted a retention of the in-
come and enjoyment of the property.99
1. The Section 2036(a) (2) Argument
The government's argument that decedent's de facto power to
control the flow of dividends amounted to a retention of the right to
designate the persons who should possess the income from the
property was rejected for two basic reasons. First, Byrum had not
retained the legally enforceable right specified by the statute.
94. See Estate of Hofford v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 542 (1945). A bona fide employ-
ment agreement with an entity previously transferred will not constitute a
retained life estate. See also Estate of Barlow v. Commissioner 55 T.C. 666
(1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. at 1. Gifts of undivided interests in family farm with
leaseback to donor-parents withstood the Service's contentions that the
scheme constituted a retained life estate.
95. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
96. Nash, supra note 1, 1020.
97. 408 U.S. at 127.
98. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2).
99. Id. § 2036(a) (1).
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"[T] he right ascribed to Byrum was the power to use his majority
position and influence over the corporate directors to 'regulate the
flow of dividends' to the trust. That 'right' was neither ascertain-
able nor legally enforceable and hence was not a right in any nor-
mal sense of that term."' 00 Secondly, it was emphasized that mere
voting control did not confer an absolute right to the grantor to
control dividend policies or guarantee his continued employment.
Byrum had a fiduciary duty as majority stockholder, as well as the
corporation's directors, which could not be abused for Byrum's
personal or family gain. Other variables such as economic de-
mands of business, were referred to by the Court as working
against the Service's concept of control. Beyond mere rejection of
the Service's arguments, the Court severely chastized their "con-
trol" rationale as being "so vague and amorphous as to be impossi-
ble of ascertainment in many instances."' 01
2. The Section 2036(a) (1) Argument
The Service reasoned that Byrum, through reserving the right
to voting control, had retained possession and enjoyment of the
property in that he could guarantee himself continued employ-
ment and renumeration from the corporations, as well as the right
to determine or control merger and liquidation.'0 2 The Court coun-
tered this argument by holding that Byrum had not retained "pos-
session and enjoyment" of the stock through a retention of an
income or possessory interest as required by section 2036.103
Moreover, no present economic benefit had been retained as
Byrum's exercise of control was subject to fiduciary restraints
under state corporation law.'0 4
3. Application to Partnership Estate Planning
The Byrum decision should provide some security to the estate
planner who is contemplating the use of a family partnership to
accomplish a capital freeze. The four types of retained control at
issue in Byrum all have counterparts in the family partnership
whose donor-partner serves as managing partner.105 Absent an
open retention of possession or enjoyment as found under letter
100. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1972) (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 137 n.10.
102. Id. at 145.
103. Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 807, (1942), result a fd, 1 T.C.
564 (1943) was distinguished on grounds that the settlor in Holland retained a
considerably greater interest than Byrum had retained. 408 U.S. at 148.
104. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 150 (1972).
105. Under the ULPA, control over partnership operations is vested in the manag-
ing or general partner. ULPA § 9; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-209 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Often there will exist transfer restrictions on the partnership interests. To-
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ruling 7824005, a donor's power to control or manage a partnership
through bona fide business relationships should not result in the
inclusion of a transferred partnership interest in the donor's estate
under section 2036.106 In any event, it is probable that the manag-
ing partner's powers will be curtailed in the partnership agree-
ment to avoid income tax pitfalls, for example, in the area of
control over partnership distribution. 0 7 Such constraints will op-
erate to strengthen arguments against estate taxation of donated
interests under the control rationale advanced by the Service in
Byrum.
Central to the Court's holding was the presence of fiduciary
constraints upon the exercise of Byrum's de facto powers. Simi-
larly, a partner is bound by a fiduciary duty, albeit more exacting,
to the partnership and his other partners.108 Whatever the amount
of control exercisable by the donor-partner may be, his powers are
always exercisable within the constraints of state fiduciary law.
Thus, a donor who wishes to remain at the head of a family busi-
ness should be able to do so without fear that his continued mana-
gerial control over the donee interests will cause the transfer to be
deemed incomplete for estate tax purposes. As stated by the
Byrum Court, "[T] his Court has never held that trust property
must be included in a settlor's gross estate solely because the set-
tlor retained the power to manage trust assets."' 0 9 This principle
should apply equally to donors of family partnerships.
D. Section 2038 Obstacles
Retained management and administrative controls by the do-
nor-partner might be construed as a power to alter, amend, revoke
or terminate over donated partnership interests causing inclusion
of those interests in the donor's gross estate under section 2038.
Controls over income distributions are arguably identical to pow-
ers over the timing or manner of enjoyment which have been taxed
pursuant to the case law under section 2038.110 However, if the do-
nor-partner's powers are limited by a definite ascertainable stan-
gether, this is equivalent to the de facto powers ascribed to Byrum under the
trust instrument.
106. See Stukenberg, Gifts of Partnership Interests with Strings Attached:
Problems and Possibilities, 51 J. TAx. 258, 258 (1979).
107. See § IV of text supra.
108. See UPA § 21; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-321 (Reissue 1976); ULPA § 9; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 67-209 (Cum. Supp. 1978). "A partnership is fiduciary in character
with each partner owning the others the highest degree of fidelity, loyalty and
fairness in their mutual dealings." In re Lester, 87 Misc. 2d 717, 721, 386
N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 (1976).
109. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 132-33.
110. See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
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dard, such as being pursuant to the reasonable needs of business,
section 2038 can be circumvented under the authority of case law
which holds that powers so limited do not cause the transfer to be
deemed incomplete under the estate tax."' Furthermore, if the
donee-partners are free to withdraw from the partnership and re-
ceive a return of their capital contribution, section 2038 should not
apply as ultimate control over the time and manner of enjoyment
of the property rests with each partner.112 As added protection,
powers affecting partnership distributions could be made exercisa-
ble only with the consent of all partners.113
E. Partnership Case Law
There are few partnership cases under section 2036 dealing with
the issue of donor-partner retained controls. Estate of Rod-
denberry v. Commissioner1 4 represents the most direct confronta-
tion of the partnership problem. Decedent had formed
partnerships to operate family owned businesses and had, over a
period of thirteen years, gifted partnership interests to his sons.
The partnership agreements vested control to the majority partner
in all matters, including the distribution of profits. The partners
could not sell or encumber their interests without unanimous con-
sent from the other partners and the partnership was to dissolve
only upon the consent of seventy-five percent of the interest in-
vested. The Service included certain donated interests in the de-
cedent's gross estate under the forerunner"15 to section 2036 on
grounds that at no time did the donees have dominion and control
over the partnership interests for reason of the conditions and re-
strictions imposed by the partnership agreement.
The Tax Court dismissed the arguments, reasoning that if the
Commissioner's position prevailed then partnership interests
could never be the subject of valid gifts should the donor retain an
interest in the partnership. Crucial to the court's decision was the
fact that the donor had added no restrictions upon the donated in-
terests that did not also apply to his capital interest. In other
words, the extent of his property interest was defined by the part-
nership agreement and he merely transferred all title he had in the
111. See Leopold v. United States, 510 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1975); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. United States 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
112. Nash, supra note 1, 1026.
113. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958). "However, section 2038 does not apply...
[i]f the decedent's power could be exercised only with the consent of all par-
ties having an interest.., in the transferred property .... Id. § 20.2038-
1 (a) (2).
114. 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 781 (1949). See also Estate of Louis Bendet, 5 T.C.M. (CCH)
302 (1946); Britt's Estate v. United States, 190 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1951).
115. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c).
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partnership interests "as free from restrictions as said interests
were held by him."116
The principle of this decision is that partnership interests sub-
ject to the conditions and restrictions set forth in an existing part-
nership agreement can be validly gifted as complete transfers
under the estate tax laws. The decision could, however, be distin-
guished from the situation in which a partnership has been forced
for the purpose of serving as a gift vehicle for an estate plan. The
facts of Roddenberry were favorable to the taxpayer in that the
partnerships were in existence for a number of years before the
gifts in issue were made. For this reason, estate planners should
be hesitant to rely totally on this case when the gifting of partner-
ship interests coincides with the formation of the partnership. As
noted by one commentator, controls which are commensurate with
the donor's ownership interest will escape taxation under section
2036; "[h] owever, if the 'controls' are not those commonly found in
business relationships, and appear to be specifically entered into
by the donor to allow him to retain control over the partnership in
excess of his ownership interest, the transferred interest likely will
be includable under Section 2036."117
Case law addressing the valuation of partnership interests for
estate tax purposes has generally been favorable to taxpayers who
have implemented control techniques such as the buy-sell agree-
ment. Although the valuation cases cannot serve as precedent for
section 2036 issues of gross estate inclusion, the case law does indi-
cate that courts are sympathetic to the needs of an owner of a fam-
ily business who wishes to preserve the business for succeeding
generations.
The most recent valuation case, Estate of Bischoff v. Commis-
sioner,n8 held that the estate tax value of a partner's interest
which was subject to a mandatory buy-sell agreement upon his
death is the amount provided for in the agreement. The court had
followed earlier precedent which had recognized mandatory buy-
sell agreements at book value for establishing the value of dece-
dent partners' interests.1 9 The Service argued that the buy-sell
provisions should be disregarded because they lacked a bona fide
business purpose and merely served as a substitute for a testa-
mentary disposition. 120 It was found, however, that the transfer re-
116. 8 T.C.M. (CCH) at 785.
117. Stukenberg, supra note 98, at 261 (footnote omitted).
118. 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
119. Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Estate of Weil v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954).
120. The Service's argument embodied the test set forth in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
2(h) (1958) for determining the estate tax value of securities which are sub-
ject to an option or contract price.
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strictions in this family partnership had a business purpose, that
the restrictions on transferability were intended to maintain own-
ership within the family and to assure continuity of management.
These objectives were held to constitute a legitimate business pur-
pose as a matter of law. Rejected was the argument that mainte-
nance of continuity of management is not a valid business purpose
in the context of a limited partnership.121 Thus, restrictive buy-sell
agreements may be placed on passive owners who are relegated to
limited partnership interests even though there would otherwise
be no direct disruption of business management.
The Bischoff case stands as an important taxpayer victory and
establishes the buy-sell agreement as a most important tool of
partnership estate planning. The restrictive buy-sell agreement
will most certainly be integrated in most partnership capital
freezes. In this respect, the estate planner can, under the case au-
thority culminating with Bischoff, operate on firm ground if the
principle motives behind the freeze include maintenance of family
ownership or continuity of management.
VI. CONCLUSION
The estate planner who finds it necessary to vest substantial
controls in the donor-partner is given little guidance from estab-
lished legal authority as to the estate tax consequences of the pro-
posed plan. In addition, many desirable control techniques will
run afoul of the family partnership income tax rules. This com-
ment attempted to identify those areas which present the greatest
threat to the estate plan's viability and to offer possible measures
which may be taken to alleviate those dangers. It must be empha-
sized that until there is established legal authority, a capital freeze
accomplished through a family partnership will be fraught with
uncertainty. The ultimate task of the estate planner is to assess
possible challenges to the proposed partnership capital freeze and
circumvent those dangers through effective planning.
Gary N. Clatterbuck '80
[S]uch [option or contract] price will be disregarded in determining
the value of the securities unless it is determined under the circum-
stances of the particular case that the agreement represents a bona
fide business arrangement and not a device to pass the decedent's
shares to the natural objects of his bounty for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Id.
121. 69 T.C. at 40. "We are convinced that the members of... [the partnerships]
entered into the respective partnership agreements in order to assure their
continuing ability to carry on their.., business without outside interference,
including that of a dissident limited partner." Id.
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